Brief of Amici Curiae Health Law & Policy Scholars and Prescription Policy Choices in Support of Respondents on the Constitutional Validity of the Medicaid Expansion by Outterson, Kevin et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070631
Bo
http://ww
B
HEALTH 
PRES
IN S
ON TH
OF T
ston Univer
Bo
E
Ge
This paper
w.bu.edu/l
RIEF OF
LAW & P
CRIPTIO
UPPORT 
E CONST
HE MED
sity School
(Ma
Kevin
ston Unive
Lau
Univer
Nicol
Univers
lizabeth 
Univers
Sara R
orge Was
Sidne
Saint Lo
 can be do
aw/faculty/
 AMICI C
OLICY S
N POLICY
OF RESP
ITUTIONA
ICAID EX
of Law Wor
y 22, 2012)
 Outterso
rsity Scho
ra Herme
sity of Tex
e Huberfe
ity of Kent
Weeks Le
ity of Geo
osenbau
hington U
y D. Wats
uis Unive
wnloaded w
scholarship
URIAE 
CHOLAR
 CHOICE
ONDENT
L VALID
PANSION
king Paper
 
n 
ol of Law
r 
as 
ld 
ucky 
onard 
rgia 
m 
niversity
on 
rsity 
ithout cha
/workingpa
S AND 
S 
S 
ITY 
 
No. 12-27 
rge at: 
pers/2012.html  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070631
No. 11-400 
================================================================ 
In The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., 
Petitioners,        
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND  
HUMAN SERVICES, et al., 
Respondents.        
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
On Writ Of Certiorari To The  
United States Court Of Appeals  
For The Eleventh Circuit 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
HEALTH LAW & POLICY SCHOLARS AND 
PRESCRIPTION POLICY CHOICES 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY 
OF THE MEDICAID EXPANSION 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
MICHAEL KEVIN OUTTERSON (Counsel of Record) 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
765 Commonwealth Avenue 
Boston, MA 02215 
(617) 353-3103 
mko@bu.edu 
LAURA HERMER, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS* 
NICOLE HUBERFELD, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
ELIZABETH WEEKS LEONARD, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 
SARA ROSENBAUM, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
SIDNEY D. WATSON, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
Counsel for Amici 
(*All institutional affiliations are 
for identification purposes only.) 
[Together With The Health Law & 
Policy Scholars Listed On Inside Cover] 
================================================================ 
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070631
 
Health Law & Policy Scholars 
GEORGE J. ANNAS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
JENNIFER S. BARD, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 
SCOTT C. BURRIS, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY  
JUNE CARBONE, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY 
KATHY CERMINARA, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
MARY ANN CHIRBA, BOSTON COLLEGE 
BRIETTA CLARK, LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY  
NATHAN CORTEZ, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY 
JUDITH F. DAAR, WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL 
BARRY R. FURROW, DREXEL UNIVERSITY 
ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
BARBARA J. GILCHRIST, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
JESSE A. GOLDNER, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
MICHELE BRATCHER GOODWIN, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
THOMAS GREANEY, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
KATE GREENWOOD, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY 
MARK A. HALL, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY 
ALLISON HOFFMAN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
SHARONA HOFFMAN, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 
DIANE E. HOFFMANN, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
LISA C. IKEMOTO, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS 
DAVID H. JOHNSON, MILLERSVILLE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
JONATHAN KAHN, HAMLINE UNIVERSITY 
AARON S. KESSELHEIM, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
FAZAL R. KHAN, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 
JOAN H. KRAUSE, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
KRISTIN MADISON, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
JESSICA MANTEL, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON 
DANA BOWEN MATTHEW, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO 
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 
FRANCES M. MILLER, BOSTON UNIVERSITY & UNIVERSITY  
 OF HAWAI’I 
ABIGAIL MONCRIEFF, BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
BENJAMIN MOULTON, FOUNDATION FOR INFORMED  
 MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 
BARBARA A. NOAH, WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY 
ALICE A. NOBLE, BOSTON COLLEGE 
DAVID ORENTLICHER, INDIANA UNIVERSITY  
JORDAN K. PARADISE, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY 
EFTHIMIOS PARASIDIS, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
 FRANK A. PASQUALE, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY 
ELIZABETH PENDO, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY 
VERNELLIA R. RANDALL, UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON 
JESSICA ROBERTS, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON 
CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 
MARC A. RODWIN, SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY 
RAND E. ROSENBLATT, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY 
THEODORE RUGER, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA  
WILLIAM M. SAGE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
SALLIE THIEME SANFORD, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON 
RICHARD S. SAVER, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
STACEY TOVINO, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS 
VICKIE J. WILLIAMS, GONZAGA UNIVERSITY 
DIANA R. H. WINTERS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
RUQAIIJAH A. YEARBY, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 
i 
 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 The Medicaid expansion in Section 2001(a)(1)(C) 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is 
one part of Congress’s comprehensive effort to expand 
access to health care coverage. This expansion is not 
revolutionary, but builds on many prior statutory 
amendments to Medicaid. Nor does it alter the volun-
tary nature of the Medicaid program – as before, 
States remain free to decline federal funding. The 
Petitioners and their amici have mischaracterized the 
expansion to obscure these facts, hoping this Court 
will unravel this hard-fought legislative enactment. 
 The question presented is whether Congress may 
offer States generous additional funding for Medicaid, 
with spending conditions that entirely satisfy the 
four-part test in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987). 
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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Health Law & Policy Scholars are scholars who 
study and teach health law and policy in the United 
States. We seek to correct the factual record on the 
history and expansion of the Medicaid program, and 
thus to place this litigation in its proper context. The 
Medicaid expansion in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is not revolutionary by any 
standard but is a step-wise extension, built on pro-
grams from various State laboratories of democracy 
over the years. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 Prescription Policy Choices is a nonprofit educa-
tional and public policy organization providing objec-
tive research and expertise on prescription drug 
policy.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
STATEMENT 
 Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program. 
States choosing to participate must submit a State 
plan for approval by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services. While Medicaid gives States some 
 
 1 This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as 
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule 
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole 
or in part by counsel for any party. Amici have borne their own 
expenses, without support from any party. The Boston Univer-
sity School of Law provided pro bono assistance. 
2 
discretion in designing and administering their pro-
grams, since 1965 federal law has imposed numerous 
mandatory requirements, including categories of in-
dividuals and families who must be covered, services 
that States must provide, and requirements for ad-
ministering the program. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 301 (1980) (“Although participation in the Medi-
caid program is entirely optional, once a State elects 
to participate, it must comply with the requirements 
of [the Medicaid Act].”); 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10). 
 Congress enacted Section 2001(a)(1)(C) of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (ACA or Act),2 to expand 
the Medicaid program, creating a new mandatory 
category of eligibility that States must cover begin-
ning January 1, 2014. ACA §2001(a)(1)(C). This 
category includes children and adults under 65 with 
incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) 
who are not pregnant, eligible for Medicare, or other-
wise eligible through another mandatory Medicaid 
category. Id. Petitioners’ constitutional challenge 
focuses on this particular provision. States’ Br. 7-8. 
Petitioners do not challenge any optional Medicaid 
features of the ACA, see, e.g., ACA §2001(a)(4) (giving 
states an option to cover those with incomes up to 
133% FPL prior to 2014); ACA §2401 (community first 
option to cover attendant-care services for those at 
 
 2 Amended by the Health Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
3 
risk of institutionalization). Neither do they challenge 
new mandatory administrative requirements for re-
porting adult quality of care for Medicaid enrollees, 
ACA §2701; major modifications to Medicaid drug 
coverage, ACA §§2501-2503; or increased primary 
care payment rates in Medicaid, ACA §1202 (as 
amended).  
 Petitioners claim that ACA §2001(a)(1)(C) is an 
“extreme and unprecedented abuse,” changing the 
fundamental nature of Medicaid. States’ Br. 23. But 
imposing new Medicaid mandatory provisions on 
States as part of a national health policy agenda is 
not unusual. Medicaid was enacted in 1965 as part of 
a suite of Social Security Act amendments that also 
created Medicare to provide health insurance for 
elderly retired workers. Since the beginning, Medi-
caid has been part of larger Congressional health 
policy programs. Also since the beginning, Medicaid 
has imposed mandatory eligibility, services, and ad-
ministrative requirements on participating States. 
The ACA’s inclusion of a new category of mandatory 
eligibility is not surprising and is in keeping with 
well-settled expectations.  
 Petitioners claim that the Act somehow radically 
departs from the first forty-seven years of Medicaid. 
States’ Br. 7-8, 10-11, 23. It is nothing new, however, 
for Congress to enact mandatory Medicaid reforms as 
part of a comprehensive package addressing national 
health policy problems. 
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 Petitioners give the impression that Congress 
has never expanded Medicaid with broader program 
conditions attached to State participation. States’ Br. 
5-6, 22. But on numerous occasions, Congress has 
required conditions for continued participation in the 
already-existing program. Congress has included 
mandatory Medicaid reforms – some related to eligi-
bility, others to benefits and coverage, and still others 
related to payment and administration – in the mix of 
broader policy interventions designed to tackle prob-
lems that transcend any single solution in a plural-
istic and multi-state health care system. See Kaiser 
Family Foundation, Medicaid: A Timeline of Key De-
velopments, 1965 – 2009. Indeed, conditional Medicaid 
expansions to address national problems have been a 
hallmark of the program since its enactment. Sidney 
D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer-
Directed Medicaid and Cost-Shifting to Patients, 51 
St. Louis L.J. 403, 405 (2007); Sara Rosenbaum, 
Medicaid, 346 New Eng. J. Med. 635, 635 (2002). The 
following examples illustrate this important facet of 
Medicaid program history, undermining key assump-
tions in Petitioners’ arguments about the supposedly 
unique constitutional injury inflicted by the Act.  
 
A. Congress Has Previously Added New Man-
datory Eligibility Categories to Medicaid 
 Petitioners are correct that in 1965, when Medi-
caid was first enacted, mandatory eligibility was 
typically tied to eligibility for federal-state cooper-
ative welfare programs. States’ Br. 2-3. However, 
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beginning in 1972, Congress amended Medicaid, 
adding mandatory federal eligibility requirements, 
often as one part of broader, national health policy 
goals. The ACA’s new mandatory category for low-
income children and adults, ACA §2001(a)(1)(C), is 
simply the latest example in this long-standing 
tradition of using Medicaid mandatory categories as 
an instrument of national health policy to guarantee 
the poorest American access to affordable health 
insurance. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: 
Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit 
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 5, 16-
22 (2006). 
 In 1972, Congress ended the federal-state coop-
erative welfare program for the aged, blind and dis-
abled and replaced it with Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI). Social Security Act Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, §§201, 301. 
Congress revised Medicaid to reflect this new na-
tional policy and required States to either extend 
Medicaid to all those eligible for the new SSI program 
or, under the so-called 209(b) option, allow those with 
incomes above the State’s old cooperative welfare 
program eligibility limits to qualify for Medicaid by 
deducting medical expenses from income. Id. §§209, 
301, as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-66, 87 Stat. 152, 
§212 (1973); Gov’t Br. 6.  
 Petitioners make much of the fact that the 1972 
amendments allowed States two options to comply 
with the new national policy. States’ Br. 4. Both 
options, however, were expansions. States did not 
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have the option to forgo expansion entirely. Gov’t Br. 
5-6.  
 In 1988, Congress went even further, completely 
de-linking Medicaid eligibility for children and preg-
nant women from federal-state cooperative welfare 
programs. Congress created new mandatory eligibil-
ity categories up to 133% FPL for children from birth 
to age 5 and pregnant women, and up to 100% FPL 
for children age 6-18. See Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), §302, Pub. L. No. 100-
360, 102 Stat. 683 (adding 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(A)(10)(i), 
1396a(l)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
§4601, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. States 
were required to cover everyone in these new manda-
tory categories. Congress did not offer States any 
choice, other than leaving Medicaid entirely.  
 
B. Congress Has Previously Expanded Man-
datory Medicaid Benefit Categories as Part 
of Broader National Child Health Policies  
 In 1967, Congress reacted to two national crises: 
rampant poor health among preschool children and 
the high rate at which young draftees were failing 
Army physical exams. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Na-
tional Security and U.S. Child Health Policy: The 
Origins and Continuing Role of Medicaid and EPSDT 
6-11 (2005). In response, Congress enacted a suite of 
reforms aimed at strengthening the education and 
training of pediatric health professionals and pro-
vided direct financing to public health departments to 
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identify, screen, and treat impoverished children and 
youth. Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Title 
III, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821.  
 As part of this larger initiative, Congress dra-
matically expanded mandatory federal Medicaid cov-
erage requirements, creating the Early and Periodic 
Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Pro-
gram. EPSDT required States to cover, at minimum: 
a comprehensive health and developmental history; a 
comprehensive unclothed physical exam; appropriate 
immunizations; laboratory tests; health education; 
vision, dental, and hearing services; and care needed 
to diagnose or treat an identified condition, even if 
that treatment is not otherwise available under a 
State’s Medicaid plan. See 42 U.S.C. 1396d(r). EPSDT 
expanded the mandatory coverage standards for 
children to a level unequaled in public or private 
health insurance at the time. Sara Rosenbaum & 
Paul S. Wise, Crossing the Medicaid-Private Insur-
ance Divide: The Case of EPSDT, 26 Health Affairs 
382, 383-384 (2007).  
 Since 1967, Congress has strengthened EPSDT 
several times, often over political objections from 
some States. See Alice Sardell & Kay Johnson, The 
Politics of EPSDT Policy in the 1990s: Policy Entre-
preneurs, Political Streams, and Children’s Health 
Benefits, 76 Milbank Q. 175, 186, 190-192, 197-198 
(1998); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, 
§6403, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (further 
delineating the scope of EPSDT benefit, including 
an express mandate that States cover “Such other 
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necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, 
and other measures . . . to correct or ameliorate 
defects and physical and mental illnesses and condi-
tions discovered by the screening services, whether or 
not such services are covered under the State plan”); 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, §6044, Pub. L. No. 109-
171, 120 Stat. 4 (requires States to preserve EPSDT 
coverage in benchmark packages); Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act of 
2009, §611, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (clarifying 
requirement to provide EPSDT in benchmark pack-
ages); ACA, §2201 (preserving EPSDT as part of the 
newly reconfigured benchmarks). 
 
C. Congress Has Previously Imposed Manda-
tory Medicaid Reimbursement Rules as 
Part of Larger Efforts to Develop and Sus-
tain a Health Care Safety Net for Medically 
Underserved Communities  
 Nearly one-third of America’s population resides 
in medically underserved urban and rural communi-
ties. Sara Rosenbaum et al., National Health Reform: 
How Will Medically Underserved Communities Fare?, 
Policy Research Brief No. 10, 3 (2009). The needs 
of these communities are acute. Their inhabitants 
tend to be sicker, poorer, and older than the general 
population, are more likely to either be uninsured or to 
have public insurance, and have diminished access to 
health care providers. See Sidney D. Watson, Mend-
ing the Fabric of Small Town America: Health Reform 
and Rural Economies, 113 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2010); 
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Kevin Grumbach et al., Physician Supply and Access 
to Care in Urban Areas, 16 Health Affairs 71, 78-79 
(1997). Although some States invested in public 
hospitals and local health department services, a 
national, systematic approach was needed to support 
a health care safety net. See, e.g., Health Resources 
and Services Administration, Designation of Medical-
ly Underserved Populations and Health Professions 
Shortage Areas, 73 Fed. Reg. 11232-11281 (Feb. 29, 
2008).  
 In response, Congress established the National 
Health Service Corps in 1972 and added the Commu-
nity Health Centers program three years later as 
basic components of Public Health Service Act pro-
grams to support services to underserved commun-
ities. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Community Health 
Centers in an Era of Health System Reform and 
Economic Downturn: Prospects and Challenges 1-2 
(2009).  
 As part of national policies to support these 
communities and the safety net providers who serve 
them, Congress added mandatory reimbursement and 
administrative requirements to Medicaid. In 1981, 
Congress required States to provide enhanced reim-
bursement to hospitals that treat a disproportionate 
number of uninsured and Medicaid patients. Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, §2173, Pub. L. 
No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357; see also Theresa A. Coughlin 
& David Liska, The Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
Hospital Payment Program: Background and Issues 
1-2 (1997). In 1989, Congress required States to pay 
clinics designated as either rural health clinics or 
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federally qualified health centers at a special, typi-
cally higher, rate. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1989, §6404, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.  
 These mandatory Medicaid reimbursement rules 
are yet another example of how Congress has used 
Medicaid to implement national health policies. 
While States retain discretion to design the outer 
limits of their Medicaid programs, Congress repeat-
edly has used mandatory Medicaid requirements to 
define the “very core.” Gov’t Br. 24, 26. 
 
D. Congress Has Previously Imposed New Man-
datory Quality Standards for Long-Term 
Care in Medicaid as Part of Broader Safety 
and Quality Efforts  
 The quality of nursing home care became a na-
tional concern in the mid-1980s, following numerous 
investigations of substandard care and patient safety 
problems. Institute of Medicine, Improving the Qual-
ity of Care in Nursing Homes 3-4 (1986). Because the 
financial base of the nursing home industry rests sub-
stantially on Medicare and Medicaid, Congress used 
these programs to reshape nursing home quality. 
In 1987, Congress enacted a detailed set of require-
ments addressing quality, resident safety, and resi-
dents’ rights as conditions for Medicare and Medicaid 
certification. These conditions of participation re-
quired nursing homes to provide regular assessments 
of residents’ functional capacities and written care 
plans based on these assessments; offer enumerated 
activities and services to residents; maintain staffing 
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levels by qualified personnel for specified hours; give 
residents transfer and discharge rights; and protect 
residents’ funds. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §4211, 101 Stat. 1330.  
 In conjunction with these amendments, Congress 
required States to establish nurse aide competency 
evaluations, registries, and nursing facility adminis-
trator standards; evaluate each mentally ill or devel-
opmentally disabled resident annually to determine 
if they should be discharged; amend State plans to 
account for new federal requirements; and, most no-
tably, conduct annual, unannounced, standardized 
surveys of long-term care facilities, with follow-up 
investigation of allegations of resident abuse and 
neglect. Id. at §§4201, 4202.  
 Once again, Medicaid mandatory requirements – 
this time mandatory requirements as to how States 
administer their programs – were added in the ser-
vice of larger national health policy concerns. 
 
E. Congress Has Previously Imposed New Man-
datory Medicaid Requirements on States as 
Part of Medicare Part D Prescription Drug 
Coverage  
 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 
117 Stat. 2066 (MMA), represents another example of  
a national health policy problem that includes Medi-
caid as part of the solution. Jonathan Oberlander, 
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Through the Looking Glass: The Politics of the Medi-
care Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderniza-
tion Act, 32 J. of Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 187, 190-191 
(2007). Republican leadership in Congress supported 
the MMA, but it was narrowly enacted with scant 
support from Democrats. Id.  
 The MMA was a response to the urgent need to 
extend affordable prescription drug coverage to the 
nation’s Medicare beneficiaries, including 8.9 million 
individuals covered by both Medicare and Medicaid 
(dual eligibles). Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured, Dual Eligibles: Medicaid’s Role for 
Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries 1 (2011). The 
Republican-led extension of the Medicare outpatient 
prescription drug benefit (Part D) to dual eligibles 
was entirely compulsory, not optional, for States. 
 Part D displaced each state’s Medicaid prescrip-
tion drug coverage program for dual eligibles. MMA 
§103. The legislation eliminated state options con-
cerning Medicaid coverage of outpatient prescription 
drugs and established a single national program 
under direct federal control. Financing included com-
pulsory State contributions (known as the “claw-
back”) toward the cost of Part D. MMA §103. The 
expenditures were not nominal: the Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that States would pay a total 
of $155 billion in clawback payments to the federal 
government between 2007 and 2016. Cong. Budget 
Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal 
Years 2007 to 2016, at 59 (2006). In 2003, States 
protested the clawback, characterizing it as “an 
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unprecedented intrusion into each State’s sover-
eignty.” Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (mem.) 
(denying original jurisdiction to States seeking an 
injunction against implementation of the Part D 
clawback); Brief of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae 
In Support of Pls., Texas, 547 U.S. 1204 (No. 135). 
Nevertheless, States have now successfully adapted 
their Medicaid programs to Part D’s requirements. 
 
F. Conclusion 
 The history of the Medicaid program is long and 
detailed. Our purpose in this Statement is to high-
light several significant mandatory expansions since 
1965 that Congress has enacted as part of larger 
national health policies. Petitioners characterize the 
ACA’s mandatory eligibility expansion as an “extreme 
and unprecedented abuse,” States’ Br. 23, 39-42, be-
cause it works in tandem with other health legisla-
tion to accomplish the national health policy goal of 
making health insurance affordable for all Americans. 
If the mandatory expansion in ACA §2001(a)(1)(C) is 
indeed coercive – as Petitioners claim – then they 
must articulate why no previous Medicaid expansions 
have been coercive. In fact, Petitioners overstate the 
discontinuity in the Act. As history makes clear, these 
changes build on prior foundations and are by no 
means unprecedented. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The ACA’s provisions expanding Medicaid eligi-
bility are entirely consistent with the recognized 
scope of congressional spending power and the long-
standing cooperative nature of the Medicaid program. 
Acknowledging that the ACA’s Medicaid provisions 
clearly satisfy the four-part test in South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-208 (1987), Petitioners now 
ask this Court to “fashion” new limits on the spending 
power. States’ Br. 28, Gov’t Br. 15-16. But the ACA 
amendments to Medicaid do not warrant a departure 
from established precedent and practice.  
 To merit novel judicial treatment of the Medicaid 
amendments, Petitioners must demonstrate that 
whatever they claim is wrong with Medicaid is entire-
ly new and novel. As a baseline, the States’ challenge 
cannot be understood to assert constitutional infirmi-
ty to tried and true features of the existing program. 
If there is a straw that breaks the camel’s back, it 
must be constitutionally distinguishable from all 
previous straws in Medicaid. Petitioners fail in this 
task. 
 The federal government has for many decades 
used Medicaid as a tool to further larger, national 
health policy goals. The fundamental elements of 
Medicaid have long been mandatory. While uncondi-
tional block grants to States might be a political 
objective for some Petitioners, it would be a late 
moment in the history of the Republic to discover that 
the Constitution requires it.  
15 
 Petitioners stake their entire coercion case on a 
single claim: that the federal government is making 
an offer the States cannot refuse, holding the existing 
Medicaid program hostage unless the States agree to 
mandatory Medicaid expansions. States’ Br. 8-9, 39-
42. But Petitioners do not – and cannot – point to any 
textual support in the ACA for their contention: each 
proffered text is either indistinguishable from many 
prior Medicaid amendments, relies on a distinction 
that entails no constitutional significance, or is 
simply misinterpreted. Furthermore, while the States 
claim the threatened loss of all Medicaid funding, 
States’ Br. 10-11, 39-40, this result is anything but a 
foregone conclusion. Rather, any denial of federal 
funding rests in the reasonable discretion of the 
Secretary, who has never withdrawn all Medicaid 
funding for State noncompliance. 
 Nor should the number of Petitioners now op-
posed to the ACA impress this Court. Political differ-
ences over health reform policy do not equate to 
unconstitutional coercion of States by Congress. Or as 
fourth circuit judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III puts it, 
“[o]ur [judicial] self-control will be put to the test. The 
health care reform act of 2010 seems misconceived in 
many ways, but flawed legislation is not on that 
account unconstitutional.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 
Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are 
Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance (in 
press, 2012). 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Congress Has Exercised Its Spending 
Power in a Clearly Constitutional Manner  
A. The Medicaid Amendments Satisfy Ex-
isting Precedent  
 The Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence clearly 
authorizes Congress to expand Medicaid to cover 
low-income children and adults, and this case does 
not compel reconsideration of well-established prece-
dent. Bedrock cases defining the federal spending 
power allow Congress to offer financial incentives to 
States willing to participate in federal programs and 
policies. States are free to refuse federal conditional 
funding and exercise their fiscal and administrative 
autonomy through their own ability to tax and spend. 
Petitioners are unable to cite any Supreme Court 
precedent supporting their arguments that the Act’s 
Medicaid amendments violate this Court’s previously 
recognized limits on the spending power or unconsti-
tutionally coerce States, as evidenced by their request 
that the Court “fashion” limits. States’ Br. 28; U.S. 
CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 Precedent undergirding the Medicaid program’s 
essential design is long-standing, unambiguous, and 
undisturbed. Since 1936, the Court has endorsed the 
general welfare clause as a separate enumerated 
power and has recognized Congress’s authority to 
place conditions on both taxing and spending to in-
fluence state policy. See United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 66 (1936); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
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U.S. 548, 591 (1937); see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 619, 644-645 (1937). Congress relied on these 
precedents when amending the Social Security Act in 
1965 to create Medicaid. 
 Two recent cases have explored limits on federal 
conditional spending power, and neither compels a 
different result for the Medicaid issue before the 
Court. First, in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987), the Court relied on the established reasoning 
in Helvering, Steward Machine, and Butler to set 
forth a four-part test for conditional spending, id. at 
207-208. In the present case, the court of appeals 
noted that “[t]he state plaintiffs do not contend that 
the Act’s Medicaid expansion violates any of these 
restrictions” under Dole. Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d 
1235, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011); Gov’t Br. 15-16.  
 Dole also rejected South Dakota’s push for a 
Tenth Amendment limitation on conditional spend-
ing, tracking the reasoning advanced by the federal 
government. See Brief for the United States, Dole, 
483 U.S. 203 (No. 86-260), 1987 WL 880322, at *15-
16; cf. Brief for South Dakota, Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (No. 
86-260), 1987 WL 880315 at *63-71. The Court ex-
pressly rejected South Dakota’s argument that the 
Tenth Amendment places an independent constitu-
tional bar on conditional spending. Dole, 483 U.S. at 
210.  
 The Court also noted: “Our decisions have recog-
nized that in some circumstances the financial in-
ducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as 
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to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into com-
pulsion.’ ” Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301 
U.S. at 589-590). Upon this language, Petitioners 
hang all their hopes. Yet Dole provided no elaboration 
and did not find coercion on the facts of that case. 
Although Dole and Steward Machine acknowledged 
the theoretical possibility of a coercion claim, those 
statements have never been uncoupled from the 
Court’s skepticism that coercion “can ever be applied 
with fitness to the relations between state and na-
tion,” Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590. As discussed 
in the Statement and in Section II, infra, these 
particular Medicaid amendments do not create 
enough “pressure” to become “compulsion.” Dole, at 
211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 589-590). 
 The second decision to explore conditional spend-
ing power and reject Tenth Amendment limitations 
was New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), 
decided a few years after Dole. New York permitted 
conditional spending to “influence a State’s legislative 
choices.” Id. at 167, 188. Congress may “encourage a 
state to conform to federal policy choices” by virtue of 
conditional spending, and if a State’s residents do not 
like the federal policy, they can instruct the State’s 
legislators to reject the federal funding. Id. at 168. 
The litigants again invited judicial enforcement 
of Tenth Amendment limits on all congressional au-
thority, but the Court declined the invitation and 
reiterated that “the Federal Government [can] hold 
out incentives to the States as a means of encourag-
ing them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes.” Id. 
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at 188; see also College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 687 (1999) (describing federal spending as a 
“gift”). The Court has never recognized the Tenth 
Amendment as a separate limit on the conditional 
spending power, and the almost fully-funded Medi-
caid expansion at issue is not the occasion to do so.  
 Finally, the Court has consistently required that 
States “clearly understand” the terms of the federal fund-
ing, protecting them from unknown terms. Arlington 
Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 
291, 296 (2006). In the present case, the Medicaid 
expansions were debated for many months and 
included a phase-in period of almost four years for 
States to assess the terms of the funding, more than 
sufficient for “clear notice.” Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).  
 
B. The Reasoning of the Court of Appeals 
Below Is Sound and Is Further Sup-
ported By Five Additional Arguments  
 These Medicaid amendments are not the compel-
ling case for creating new precedent that the States 
depict them to be, and not just for the reasons articu-
lated by the court of appeals below. See Florida v. 
HHS, 648 F.3d at 1267-1268. At least five additional 
arguments support the Act’s constitutionality.  
 First, the federal government has for many 
decades used Medicaid as a tool to further larger, 
national health policy goals. Congress has mandated 
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the fundamental elements of Medicaid – the baseline 
requirements of who is eligible and what services 
they must receive – while allowing options that 
expand beyond the baselines. See Statement, supra. 
Mandatory Medicaid eligibility has been expanded 
several times, and although on each occasion States 
could have withdrawn from the program, neverthe-
less, they remain. Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006) (“States 
are not required to participate in Medicaid, but all 
of them do.”).  
 Second, while the States claim the threatened 
loss of all Medicaid funding, States’ Br. 10-11, 39-40, 
this result is not automatic but rests in the reason-
able discretion of the Secretary, who has never with-
drawn all Medicaid funding for State noncompliance. 
See Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. 
of S. California, Inc., Docket Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 
and 10-283, 7-8, 23-25 (2011). HHS policy is to work 
with States to encourage compliance rather than to 
penalize fragile Medicaid beneficiaries. See 42 C.F.R. 
430.32 (States found to be out of compliance with 
federal requirements will be asked to “correct” diver-
gent practices); 42 C.F.R. 430.35 (State funding will 
not be withheld until “a reasonable effort has been 
made to resolve the issues through conferences and 
discussions”). The Medicaid Act provides that “the 
Secretary shall notify [the] State agency that further 
payments will not be made to the State (or, in his 
discretion, that payments will be limited to categories 
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under or parts of the State plan not affected by such 
failure), until the Secretary is satisfied that there will 
no longer be any such failure to comply.” 42 U.S.C. 
1396c (emphasis added); 42 C.F.R. 430.35 (indicating 
that HHS will resume any funding that was halted 
once compliance is demonstrated).  
 Petitioners’ fear of total funding loss, States’ Br. 
35 n.15, 37, 39-40, is simply not cognizable, as the 
Secretary has never exercised this power in forty-
seven years of Medicaid administration. The Secre-
tary has not threatened these States with the loss of 
all funds after adoption of the ACA. See Gov’t Br. 40-
41. Coercion would surely require more than a theo-
retical fear of a never-expressed threat before the 
claim is ripe for constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (“The fact 
that Connecticut has not chosen to press the en-
forcement of this statute deprives these controversies 
of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition 
of constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be 
umpire to debates concerning harmless, empty shad-
ows.”). 
 Third, though Petitioners argue they are “locked” 
into participating in Medicaid, States’ Br. 45 n.17, 
and it may be true that most States could not afford 
to run their own medical assistance programs absent 
changes in their tax laws, many steps lie between 
this argument and the conclusion that States are 
coerced into participating in Medicaid. The federal 
government does not coerce States simply because 
they lack the political will to leave Medicaid or to 
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provide funding for similar care. These arguments 
speak to State behavior, not federal power. Medicaid 
fills a need; one that the States ceded to the federal 
government but could take back if desired. Courts 
have long held that the temptation of funding does 
not actually remove States’ “freedom of the will,” 
Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 589-590, to make a 
choice and live with the consequences.  
 Fourth, the essence of Petitioners’ argument is 
that when States accept vast quantities of federal 
funds, States should gain control over federal appro-
priations. In short, if States depend on Medicaid, it 
must be coercive. If this paradox were true, then 
States would have a perverse incentive to maximize 
federal funding and their reliance upon it to such a 
degree that the federal government would be forced to 
cede control over its appropriations to the States. 
While unconditional block grants to States might be a 
political objective for some Petitioners, it is a late 
moment in the history of the Republic to discover that 
the Constitution requires it. This perverse view turns 
a successful model of cooperative federalism on its 
head and ignores the dual nature of Our Federalism, 
wherein both States and the United States can exer-
cise independent powers to tax and spend.  
 Fifth, federal spending legislation is the law of 
the land by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. Telling 
the federal government that it cannot set the terms of 
its own duly enacted conditional spending statute 
would be a dangerous step toward reversing the 
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foundational, near-century-old understanding of the 
power to spend as a distinct enumerated power. 
 
II. The Medicaid Amendments Are Not Coer-
cive 
 Petitioners must demonstrate that whatever is 
wrong with Medicaid is entirely new and novel. 
Constitutional infirmity cannot be attached to tried 
and true features of the existing program. The straw 
that breaks the camel’s back must be constitutionally 
distinguishable from all previous straws in Medicaid. 
Petitioners fail in this task. 
 
A. Petitioners Do Not Challenge the Con-
stitutionality of the Existing Medicaid 
Program 
 Petitioners do not claim that Medicaid itself is 
unconstitutional as it stood immediately before the 
Act. States’ Br. 5; Pet’rs’ Cert. Pet. 6-7. Precision is 
important here. Petitioners attack Medicaid with 
broad-brush strokes, conflating the cost of the exist-
ing Medicaid program with the new amendments. See 
States’ Br. 39 (“The coerciveness of that demand is 
self-evident, as the sheer size of the federal induce-
ment at stake puts this spending legislation in a class 
of one. Medicaid is already the single largest federal 
grant-in-aid program, accounting for a staggering 
40% of all federal funds distributed to States and 
nearly 7% of total federal spending.”). They make no 
claim that Congress’s previous Medicaid amendments 
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are in any way constitutionally invalid. To make 
sense of Petitioners’ coercion argument, the Court 
must understand that their contention is limited to 
very specific subsections of the new Medicaid amend-
ments in a few portions of Title II of the Act that 
allegedly threaten existing Medicaid funding. States’ 
Br. 40-41.  
 But the existing Medicaid program is not on trial 
here. If anything, Petitioners profess their reliance on 
existing Medicaid funding. States’ Br. 39-41. The cost 
of the existing Medicaid program is relevant – if at all 
– only if the federal government actually threatens to 
cut off all funds in order to unconstitutionally coerce 
the States, which it has never done since 1965 and 
does not threaten to do here. See Section I.B., supra. 
 
B. The Optional Medicaid Amendments Are 
Not Coercive 
 Throughout the history of the Medicaid program, 
some coverage expansions have been mandatory 
while others are completely optional for States. See 
Statement, supra (describing the history of the pro-
gram). The Medicaid expansions under the Act are no 
different. For example, ACA Section 2001(a)(4) gives 
States the option to expand coverage before January 
1, 2014, and ACA Section 2401 gives States the op- 
tion to provide certain home and community-based 
services. Petitioners do not challenge any optional 
Medicaid amendments as coercive. See Gov’t Br. 53 
n.24 (citing States’ Br. 47-48, 50). 
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C. The Mandatory Medicaid Amendments 
Are Not Coercive 
1. The Allegedly Partisan Nature of 
the Act Is Not Evidence of Coercion  
 One of Petitioners’ amici emphasizes the partisan 
nature of the ACA enactment process. Br. of Center 
for Constitutional Jurisprudence et al. in Support of 
Pet’rs (Medicaid) 13-16. Although the constitutional 
salience of this statement is unclear, we make a few 
observations.  
 Petitioners claim to represent twenty-six States 
at the present moment, States’ Br. ii, but when Con-
gress voted for the ACA in March 2010, Senators or 
Representatives from twenty-two of the twenty-six 
Petitioner States voted for the Act. Kevin Outterson, 
Obama Couldn’t Have Done It Without You, Red State 
Edition, The Incidental Economist (February 14, 
2012). From the Petitioners’ congressional delega-
tions, a total of twenty-one United States Senators 
and eighty-eight Members of the House of Represen-
tatives voted for the Act. Id. Quite simply, the Act 
could not have passed without the support in 2010 
from the Petitioners’ duly elected congressional dele-
gations. As is often the case, the political landscape 
changed after the mid-term elections in November 
2010,3 but that change should alert this Court to the 
 
 3 After the 2010 mid-term elections and after Judge Vinson 
had issued his substantive opinion on the motion to dismiss, 716 
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010), six states (Ohio, Kansas, Wyo-
ming, Wisconsin, Maine, and Iowa) joined this suit as Petitioners 
(Continued on following page) 
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dangerous implications of a State’s subsequent politi-
cal leadership claiming that the former leadership 
had been coerced. Shifting political winds do not im-
ply coercion. 
 In addition, at least one of the Petitioners is a 
house divided. The Governor of Iowa is listed here as 
a Petitioner; meanwhile, the Attorney General of 
Iowa has joined two briefs in support of the Act. Br. of 
California et al. in Support of Resp. (Severability); Br. 
of Maryland et al. in Support of Pet’r (Minimum 
Coverage Provision). We should not assume that the 
Petitioners represent a monolithic consensus within 
their States. Politics will run their course in due time 
through the elected branches of our government.  
 
2. The Mandatory Medicaid Amendments 
Are Not a Novel Feature of the Act 
 For many decades Congress has modified the 
Medicaid program through a combination of optional 
and mandatory provisions. See Statement, supra. In-
deed, most federal spending power legislation attaches 
mandatory conditions to receipt of federal funds. See, 
e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Man-
datory coverage categories are not a “transformation 
of Medicaid,” States’ Br. 38, but have been a remark-
ably common feature of the program for decades. See 
 
on January 18, 2011 through the filing of a Second Amended 
Complaint in the district court, N.D. Fla. Dkt. 148, despite the 
passing of the court’s deadline for new parties to be added. 
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Statement, supra (describing mandatory Medicaid 
coverage categories over time). Given this historical 
continuity, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate 
why this particular set of Medicaid amendments 
somehow crosses a constitutionally significant line.  
 
3. The Federal Government Bears About 
95% of the Cost of the Mandatory 
Medicaid Amendments 
 The Medicaid amendments themselves are not 
coercive because they will cost the States little or no 
money. The mandatory expansions qualify for very 
generous federal matching (FMAP) of 100% from 
2014-2016, phasing down to 90% FMAP in 2020 and 
thereafter. 42 U.S.C. 1396d(y). Official projections 
claim the Act will save the States $33 billion. Memo-
randum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, CMS, 
to the Obama Administration and Congress 12 
(Apr. 22, 2010) (“The net impact of the Medicaid and 
CHIP provisions on State Medicaid costs is a reduc- 
tion totaling $33 billion through fiscal year 2019.”); 
Matthew Buettgens et al., ACA and State Govern-
ments: Consider Savings as Well as Costs, Urban 
Institute (July 2011). A state-by-state analysis by The 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 
projected that over the coming decade, the federal 
government will pay for 95% of the incremental costs 
under the Medicaid amendments, leaving 5% of the 
costs ($21.1 billion) to be paid by the States. John 
Holahan & Irene Headen, Medicaid Coverage and 
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Spending in Health Reform: National and State-by-
State Results for Adults at or Below 133% FPL at 2 
(2010). 
 Other cost estimates are not germane because 
they are not limited to the mandatory Medicaid 
expansions at issue in this case. For example, some 
cost estimates include the enrollment of previously 
eligible individuals, which are not new mandatory 
coverage expansions. See Cong. Research Service, 
Variation in Analyses of PPACA’s Fiscal Impact on 
States (Sept. 8, 2010). Petitioners make no claim that 
Medicaid before the ACA was unconstitutional. Nor 
have they articulated any theory explaining why it 
is unconstitutional to encourage enrollment of people 
already entitled to coverage under existing law. The 
cost of any optional Medicaid provisions – about 60% 
of Medicaid costs in 2007 – is also irrelevant to this 
case and cannot be a basis for a coercion claim. See 
Gov’t Br. 4, 29-30.  
 The fiscal impact of the mandatory coverage ex-
pansions on the States, when paired with an exceed-
ingly generous 95% average federal match, is so 
modest that the Petitioners “argument as to coercion 
is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.” Dole, 483 
U.S. at 211. Just as the withholding of 5% of federal 
highway funds could not be coercive in Dole, the 5% 
State contribution to mandatory Medicaid expansion 
cannot be considered coercive here.  
 Petitioners quibble with this in only a half-
hearted way. Their primary point of contention is not 
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with the existing Medicaid program, or the various 
optional and ancillary Medicaid amendments per se, 
but with the very specific provisions that allegedly 
threaten the loss of existing Medicaid funding. States’ 
Br. 8-9, 39-42. To these arguments we now turn. 
 
D. Petitioners Fail to Identify Any Con-
stitutionally Infirm Text in the Manda-
tory Medicaid Amendments  
 Petitioners stake their entire coercion case on a 
single claim: that the federal government is making 
an offer the States cannot refuse, holding the existing 
Medicaid program hostage unless the States spend 
$21.1 billion over a decade on the mandatory Medi-
caid expansions. States’ Br. 8-9, 39-42.  
 Petitioners are unaccountably vague as to the 
exact textual source of their troubles. See States’ Br. 
39 (“The ACA threatens States with loss of all of their 
federal Medicaid funding if they do not capitulate to 
Congress’ mandate that they dramatically expand 
their obligations under the program.”). The Petition-
ers offer no citation for that dramatic statement. 
Indeed, throughout that four-page section of their 
brief, no citation is made to any provision in the ACA. 
See States’ Br. 39-42. Petitioners have yet to identify 
the precise language that is allegedly coercive and 
compels that conclusion. Petitioners obliquely suggest 
several candidates: (1) mandatory coverage expansion 
for low-income children and adults; (2) the “essential 
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health benefits” standard; (3) the “maintenance-of-
effort” rule; and (4) Section 2304. States’ Br. 7-13. As 
we demonstrate in the sub-sections immediately 
following, each proffered text is either indistinguish-
able from many prior Medicaid amendments, relies 
on a distinction that entails no constitutional signifi-
cance, or is simply misinterpreted. 
 
1. Medicaid Expansion to Low-Income 
Children and Adults Is Constitutional 
 Petitioners assert that the Act is unique in ex-
tending coverage to low-income children and adults, 
beginning January 1, 2014. States’ Br. 6-7. This pro-
vision is found in ACA Section 2001(a)(1)(C), amend-
ing 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). See Statement, 
supra (discussing this coverage expansion and its 
historical antecedents). Petitioners do not articulate 
any plausible constitutional distinction between this 
group of children and adults and existing Medicaid 
beneficiaries to whom federal law already guarantees 
coverage.  
 Medicaid presently mandates coverage for seven 
categories of children and nonelderly adults. 42 U.S.C. 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)-(VII); see Statement, supra. Peti-
tioners articulate no reason why it is suddenly uncon-
stitutional to adopt an eighth mandatory category of 
low-income children and adults under the age of 65 
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with incomes up to 133% FPL4 who are not pregnant 
women, Medicare-eligible, or in another mandatory 
category. The ACA’s new category becomes mandatory 
in 2014. In the meantime, it is an optional category 
that States may choose to cover. See Section II.E., 
infra (describing the efforts of early-adopter States). 
 Petitioners may have preferred that Congress 
had given this population coverage through the ACA 
health insurance exchanges with tax subsidies, see 
States’ Br. 35-36, but this policy disagreement does 
not rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity. Con-
gress had rational reasons for choosing Medicaid: it 
costs less per person than private insurance and has 
a long and honorable track record of serving Ameri-
ca’s poorest and most vulnerable. Whether the Pe-
titioners agree with these reasons is the realm of 
politics, not constitutional law. 
 
2. The Essential Health Benefits Pro-
vision Is Constitutional 
 The second textual candidate – although not 
clearly cited by Petitioners – is the requirement that 
 
 4 Petitioners are concerned about the size of this Medicaid 
expansion, States’ Br. 7-8, but do not articulate any specific con-
stitutional infirmity with 133% FPL as a boundary, which in 
2012 is an annual income of $14,856.10 for an individual in the 
continental United States, or $30,656.50 for a family of four. 
2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12 
poverty.shtml. Why is 100% FPL constitutional, but 133% is 
allegedly not? 
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States provide the ACA’s new mandatory category 
of low-income children and adults with Medicaid 
benchmark coverage that includes the ACA’s “es- 
sential health benefits” (EHB). See ACA §2001(a)(2), 
amending 42 U.S.C. 1396a(k)(1); ACA §2001(c), 
amending 42 U.S.C. 1396u-7(b)(5); and the closely 
related provisions describing “benchmark” coverage, 
id. While the Petitioners label this issue “minimum 
essential coverage,” States’ Br. 8, see ACA §1302, the 
core definition for Medicaid purposes is EHB, from 
which both benchmark plans and minimum essential 
coverage are measured. ACA §2001(c)(3), amending 
42 U.S.C. 1396u-7(b)(5). Petitioners’ confusion may 
arise from the fact that ACA §2001(a)(2) provides for 
the new EHB requirement and includes the phrase 
“minimum essential coverage” in its caption. See ACA 
§2001(a)(2). 
 Petitioners characterize the EHB changes as 
novel and revolutionary. States’ Br. 8 (“that new and 
onerous requirement . . . ”). As the history of Medicaid 
aptly demonstrates, program design has never been 
static, see Statement, supra, and mandatory coverage 
standards for categorically needy individuals have 
been a hallmark of the program since 1965. See 42 
U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A). Coverage changes are an an-
nual feature of most commercial health plans and are 
similarly unsurprising in Medicaid. This common-
place activity does not rise to the level of unconstitu-
tional coercion.  
 While the federal government has historically 
and constitutionally mandated minimum Medicaid 
33 
coverage standards, the federal government has, in 
the case of the EHB, indicated an intention to dele-
gate to the States authority to define the details of 
the EHB. Center for Consumer Information and In-
surance Oversight, Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Essential Health Benefits Bulletin at 8 
(Dec. 16, 2011). For example, the definition of bench-
mark plans in the HHS guidance allows States to 
choose among several types of plans offered in the 
large group or small group markets, thus allowing 
the EHB package to vary from State to State, based 
on local commercial market factors. Id.; see also 
Institute of Medicine, Essential Health Benefits: 
Balancing Coverage and Cost (Oct. 7, 2011). Many 
other decisions are also being made at the State level, 
such as the distinction between medical and nonmed-
ical benefits, id. at 4-19 to 4-20, and the definition 
of “medical necessity,” id. at 5-23 to 5-28. Therefore, 
Petitioners’ claim that the Act “eliminates the flexi- 
bility States previously enjoyed,” States’ Br. 8, is 
unfounded and overstated. Indeed, HHS policy on 
implementing the ACA more broadly has reflected a 
commitment to “maximum flexibility” to the States in 
implementing the Act’s cooperative programs. See, 
e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Establish-
ment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 
Fed. Reg. 41866, 41893 (July 15, 2011) (announcing 
regulations affording State regulators “significant 
flexibility” in applying standards for qualified health 
plans under the new State Exchanges). 
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 Petitioners are reduced to arguing that conform-
ing Medicaid to the same coverage standard required 
for many commercial insurance plans under ACA 
§1302 is unconstitutionally coercive, while not chal-
lenging Section 1302 itself. This is thin gruel for a 
coercion claim, especially when States pay so little of 
the incremental cost.  
 
3. The Maintenance-of-Effort Provision 
Is Not Coercive 
 Only one subsection in the Act appears to condi-
tion existing FMAP on immediate compliance with a 
provision Petitioners find objectionable: the “maintenance-
of-effort” (MOE) provision in ACA §2001(b)(2), amend-
ing 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg); States’ Br. 6, 8-9, 45 n.17; 
Gov’t Br. 30-31. As CMS explained to States, “[t]he 
MOE provisions in the Affordable Care Act generally en-
sure that States’ coverage for adults under the Medicaid 
program remains in place pending implementation of 
coverage changes that become effective in January 
2014.” CMS, Letter to State Medicaid Directors, Re: 
Maintenance of Effort 1 (Feb. 25, 2011) (MOE Letter). 
 Claims of coercion or lack of clear notice are not 
supportable given that HHS has used MOE provi-
sions in many previous situations. Mark Greenberg, 
HHS Policy Guidance On Maintenance of Effort, As-
sistance, and Penalties: Summary and Discussion, 4 
Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 315 (1997). Indeed, the 
“Affordable Care Act MOE statutory provisions are 
very similar to the MOE provisions in section 
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5001(f)(1) of the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act,” which were in place and to which States 
were subject before the ACA was passed. See MOE 
Letter, at 1.  
 In addition, the relevant MOE provision here is 
temporary, expiring State by State as exchanges are 
created, no later than Dec. 31, 2013.5 ACA §2001(b)(2), 
codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg)(1)-(2). When States 
have fully operational exchanges, the relevant part 
of the MOE provision is effectively waived. ACA 
§2001(b)(2).  
 Finally, the MOE provision cannot support a co-
ercion argument because States may receive a waiver 
of the requirement through a simple process. Peti-
tioners complain that the mandatory expansions 
will directly impact their budgets, States’ Br. 18, 39, 
but ignore ACA §2001(b)(2), amending 42 U.S.C. 
1396a(gg)(3), which excuses State noncompliance 
with the MOE with respect to non-pregnant, non-
disabled adults earning more than 133% FPL if “the 
State certifies to the Secretary that, with respect to 
the State fiscal year during which the certification is 
made, the State has a budget deficit, or with respect 
 
 5 For children under 19, the MOE provision expires on Oc-
tober 1, 2019. Section 2001(b)(2), codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg)(2). 
Petitioners do not specifically challenge the children’s eligibility 
rules, focusing their complaint at the expansion for low-income 
childless adults, States’ Br. 7-8, so the relevant expiration date is 
no later than December 31, 2013. 
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to the succeeding year, the State is projected to have 
a budget deficit.” Id; MOE Letter, at Q.5.  
 At least one Petitioner has made this certifica-
tion to the Secretary. On December 29, 2011, the 
State of Wisconsin filed the required certification. 
Letter from Mike Huebsch, Secretary, Wisconsin 
Department of Administration (Dec. 29, 2011) (at-
tachment). Under this certification and pending an 
amendment to the State plan, Wisconsin will dis-
enroll 53,161 Wisconsin residents from Medicaid. 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 2011-2013 
Medicaid Efficiencies, Maintenance of Effort (MOE) 
Waiver Request of Eligibility Restrictions Established 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) (undated, circa 2011). The certification 
excuses Wisconsin from the MOE provision until 
June 30, 2013, and thereafter if Wisconsin files again. 
Id.  
 
4. Section 2304 Is a Modest Clarifica-
tion, Not a Sweeping Change 
 As the last arrow in their quiver, Petitioners 
claim “the Act requires States not only to pay the 
costs of care and services for Medicaid enrollees, but 
also to assume responsibility for providing ‘the care 
and services themselves.’ ” States’ Br. 9. This may 
sound like a commandeering claim, but it is nothing 
of the sort. Petitioners cite ACA Section 2304, con-
cerning “the care and services themselves,” States’ Br. 
9, but curiously ignore the use of the disjunctive “or” 
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immediately before and “or both” immediately after 
their quote. The full text of Section 2304 (found not 
in the text, but only in their appendix, States’ Br. 
45a) inserts “or the care and services themselves, or 
both.” The omitted language is significant; in fact, the 
omitted language entirely undermines Petitioners’ 
ensuing argument.  
 The purpose of this provision was merely to clar-
ify the long-standing meaning of “medical assistance” 
in Medicaid. See Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Tri-
angle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medi-
caid Entitlements, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 413, 453-458 
(2008). The House Report makes this abundantly 
clear: 
 Section 1905(a) of the Social Security 
Act defines the term “medical assistance.” 
The term is expressly defined to refer to 
payment but has generally been understood 
to refer to both the funds provided to pay 
for care and services and to the care and 
services themselves. The Committee, which 
has legislative jurisdiction over Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act, has always un- 
derstood the term to have this combined 
meaning. Four decades of regulations and 
guidance from the program’s administering 
agency, the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, have presumed such an un-
derstanding and the Congress has never 
given contrary indications. 
H.R. Rep. No. 111-299, 1st Sess., at 649-650, 2009 WL 
3321420, at *693-695 (Leg. Hist.) (Oct. 14, 2009); see 
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also 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, 1856, 2010 WL 1006359 
(Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (explain-
ing on the House floor the committee report’s ra-
tionale for the clarification); id. at H1891, 1967, 2010 
WL 1027566 (Mar. 21, 2010); Jane Perkins & Gene 
Coffey, Patient Protection Act Clarifies The Meaning 
of “Medical Assistance,” National Health Law Pro-
gram (March 31, 2010) (discussing the cases and 
legislative history). This modest clarification does not 
require any State to provide medical services directly.  
 
E. The Medicaid Amendments Cannot Be 
Considered Coercive to Early Adopter 
States 
 ACA §2001(a)(4) allows “early adopter” States 
to voluntarily expand coverage prior to January 1, 
2014. Minnesota, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. 
have taken advantage of this provision and other 
States, such as Massachusetts and California, have 
essentially become early adopters through Medicaid 
waivers.  
 The example of early adopter States advances 
two arguments. First, the fact that some States have 
eagerly expanded optional coverage years ahead of 
schedule undermines Petitioners’ claim of coercion. 
Clearly, these States, and other States filing briefs 
supporting the Act, embrace the Medicaid amend-
ments.  
 Second, States accepting these benefits should be 
protected from any ruling that would strike down 
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relevant portions of the Medicaid amendments. The 
Petitioners, if successful on this issue, seek the free-
dom to reject the federal offer, but this remedy should 
not be imposed on other States that willingly accept 
the Medicaid amendments. The more appropriate 
remedy “would be to enjoin the ‘application’ of the 
provision to unconsenting States and otherwise to 
permit the eligibility extension to function as writ-
ten.” Gov’t Br. 53 (citation omitted). Any State that 
wants to continue to access federal funds under the 
ACA should be allowed to do so, whether or not a 
sister State alleges coercion. Federalism is not well 
served by destroying the carefully crafted laws and 
programs that many States have built in reasonable 
reliance on the ACA, including the exchanges and 
accepting the offer of early optional expansion. Br.  
of California et al. in Support of Resp. (Severability), 
13-27 (detailing the legislative efforts of California 
and other States to implement the ACA). 
 Connecticut was the first state to take advantage 
of the early adoption provision. Connecticut First in 
Nation to Expand Medicaid Coverage to New Groups 
Under the Affordable Care Act, U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services (June 21, 2010). Connecti-
cut expected that 45,000 adults would become Medi-
caid-eligible under the new expansion. Id.  
 In May 2010, the District of Columbia followed 
suit. Darryl Fears, D.C. Jumps At Health-Care Sav-
ings In Expanded Medicaid, Wash. Post, May 14, 
2010, at B2. The approval of the request of the Dis-
trict of Columbia for the early enactment of the 
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Medicaid expansion meant “switch[ing] 35,000 indi-
viduals from an insurance program funded by city 
taxpayers to the Medicaid program.” Id.  
 In January 2011, Minnesota expanded the state’s 
Medical Assistance Program, “provid[ing] MA benefits 
for an estimated 51,000 adults currently enrolled in 
MinnesotaCare and approximately 12,000 people not 
enrolled in a state health care program.” Governor 
Dayton Expedites Medicaid Expansion, Home Page of 
the Office of the Governor (Jan. 20, 2011). 
 Under a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver, Massa-
chusetts has already expanded subsidized insurance 
coverage to the population between 100% and 133% 
of the FPL. Br. of Health Care For All et al. (Mini-
mum Coverage Provision) 7. Coverage has been ex-
tended to 411,722 Massachusetts residents under its 
reforms. Id. at 9. Absent the additional federal fund-
ing through this waiver, Massachusetts could not 
continue its Chapter 58 health care reform initiative. 
Id. at 7. Massachusetts and CMS recently agreed on a 
$26.75 billion extension of this waiver for the next 
three years. Governor Patrick Announces $26.75 Bil-
lion Medicaid Waiver Agreement (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 California also was granted a Medicaid waiver 
to allow the State to transition to Medicaid expansion 
to take place in 2014 under the Act. California De-
partment of Healthcare Services, California Bridge to 
Reform: A Section 1115 Waiver Fact Sheet (Nov. 2010). 
Though not utilizing provisions in the ACA itself, the 
waiver expands coverage to those individuals who 
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will be newly eligible under the Medicaid expansion 
in 2014. Id. California has nearly seven million un-
insured individuals and roughly a fifth of those 
individuals are expected to be covered by 2016 under 
the program. Kaiser Family Foundation, California’s 
“Bridge To Reform” Medicaid Demonstration Waiver 
(Oct. 2011 Update). As with Massachusetts, Califor-
nia is heavily relying on these Medicaid expansions to 
ensure that it can afford to provide healthcare for its 
residents. Br. for California et al. in Support of Resp. 
(Severability) 28 (“Hundreds of thousands of individ-
uals could thus face losing their health insurance.”). 
 The clearly expressed desire of these early 
adopter States, which are eager to accept the federal 
offer to help hundreds of thousands of State resi-
dents, demonstrates that Petitioners’ fear of coercion 
is not universally felt amongst the States. In no event 
should the reasonable expectations of these States, 
including enhanced FMAP for mandatory and op-
tional coverage expansions, be upset by the inchoate 
fears of their sister States. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
   
42 
CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the court of appeals upholding 
the Medicaid eligibility expansion should be affirmed. 
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